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Legal scholarship has shown increasing sensitivity to the income
redistributive effects of legal and administrative programs, especially
the effects on the lowest income groups. Predictably, this trend has
been accompanied by more extensive use of the tools of economic
analysis. Many of the programs subjected to this legal-economic anal-
ysis distribute their benefits in non-cash forms (e.g., health services,
job training, housing, legal services), generally referred to as "in-kind"
transfers. Where the goal of the particular program is the welfare of
the low-income recipients, welfare economics traditionally favors pro-
grams which distribute benefits in the form of cash transfers, for the
recipient can replicate for himself any desired in-kind benefit with
the cash transferred.1 Thus, a household receiving $100 in cash can
purchase $100 worth of health services, or spend less on health sen-
ices and allocate the rest to housing, food or recreation. By forcing
the recipient household to take $100 of health services, the donor gov-
ernment at best gives the recipient the welfare benefit of a $100
cash payment, and more probably gives him something less.
Despite this simple but powerful advantage of cash transfer plans,
in-kind programs flourish. It is generally thought that in-kind plans
are chosen over cash-payment plans not to benefit the direct recipients
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1. This presumption is subject to important caveats. The "paternalistic" approach
suggests the possibility that the low-income recipients determine this utility in a faulty
manner. To the extent that "paternalistic" legislation provides needed information, it
can be viewed as providing two in-kind transfers (e.g., health and knowledge). To the
extent that "paternalistic" legislation provides benefits for individuals other than the
direct recipients, it is covered by the following textual discussion.
The market may also be unable or unwilling to provide the service to the low-income
purchaser. Racial discrimination is the most oft-cited obstacle facing the low-income cash
recipient in his efforts to replicate the in-kind service through market purchase.
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but to please the donors. Thus, some members of society may gain
greater donative utility if their tax funds reach low-income recipients
in specified forms rather than in the less restrictive form of cash. Others
may gain benefits from the aesthetic improvements inherent in better
neighborhood housing or better clothed neighbors. However, these
indirect recipients are unlikely to be of low income. Where the ob-
ject of government expenditure is the increased welfare of the poor,
in-kind programs would still appear presumptively inferior to cash
payment programs.
Given this analysis, it is an important event when an addition to the
legal literature announces the discovery of a conceptual framework
which establishes the a priori superiority on redistributive grounds
of an in-kind program over cash payments. The in-kind program con-
sidered involves the increased quality of rental housing for low-income
families. In support of the program involved, the study dismisses many
problems which have heretofore haunted analysts of the rental hous-
ing market. The complex and critical nature of the housing market
combined with these bold assertions add to the importance of the
claims made in this study. I refer to Professor Bruce Ackerman's 100-
page discussion of housing code enforcement and income redistri-
bution which appeared in this journal.2 While Professor Ackerman
deserves commendation for his courage in assaulting established doc-
trine, his analysis is basically flawed and his conclusions suspect. If
the problems in issue were less important or if the solutions to these
problems could be determined intuitively, this critique would be
unnecessary. However, the problems of low-income housing are both
important and highly complex. In addition, the mode of analysis
chosen by Professor Ackerman requires special critical appraisal. Eco-
nomic analysis can make significant contributions to the legal litera-
ture. However, the complexity of the analysis and its unfamiliarity to
many of the readers of legal journals require additional care on the
part of the analyst. If the tools of economics are to realize their po-
tential in the context of legal scholarship, they must be carefully em-
ployed. The importance of the problems, as well as the novelty and
potential value of the analytical tools, justify further discussion of
Professor Ackerman's article.
3
2. Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing
Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Regulating Slum Housing].
3. The importance of correcting any misconceptions created by Professor Ackerman's
article is far from speculative. Its portrayal of the forces at work in the urban housing mar-
ket has apparently influenced the outcome of at least one recent landlord-tenant decision
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Professor Ackerman's basic presentation may be outlined as follows:
(1) If the supply of slum housing units is fixed and unresponsive
to increased costs of production, and the demand is responsive to
changes in rent, the increased costs imposed on landlords by code en-
forcement will not be passed on to tenants as increased rent
(2) If the supply is not fixed, then a code enforcement plan plus a
government housing subsidy will produce a situation in which the
tenant again will receive higher quality housing without any increase
in rent.
(3) If the costs to landlords are ignored in the determination of
social value, a "leverage" effect exists such that a code enforcement
plan which distributes its benefits in the form of rental-unit quality
improvements has a presumptive advantage over cash-payment plans
on redistributive grounds.
(4) The additional costs imposed on landlords by tie code enforce-
ment will have virtually no effect on investment in either low-income
housing or housing in general and therefore no appreciable decrease
in the supply of low-income rental units will occur.
(5) Improved housing will not prompt any appreciable in-migra-
tion of tenants into the area. Therefore, there need be no concern
about possible increased rents from this source.4
The first part of this critique will assume the validity of Professor
Ackerman's models and his postulates in order to focus on an exami-
nation of the "leverage" effect. The second part will examine these
models and the assertions which seemingly allow Professor Ackerman
to transform his models into reality.
of great potential import. Thus, in Robinson v. Dianont Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853
(D.C. Cir. 1972), Judge J. Skelly Wright reasoned as follows:
Of course, if the housing market is structured in such a may that it is impossible
for landlords to absorb the cost of bringing their units into compliance with the
housing code, there may be nothing a court can do to prevent vigorous code enforce-
ment from driving low-cost housing off the market. But the most recent scholarship
on the subject indicates this danger is largely imagined. In fact, it appears that
vigorous code enforcement plays little or no role in the decrease in low-cost housing
stock. When code enforcement is seriously pursued, market forces generally prevent
landlords from passing on their increased costs through rent increases. See gezerally
Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing
Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE UJ. 1093 (1971).
463 F.2d at 860 (footnote omitted).
Such a conception of the housing market may be substantially erroneous and the ef-
fects of decisions based upon this conception may differ materially from those expected.
It is important that the legal community be aware that not all "recent scholarship" can
portray so manageable a housing market.
4. This outline is not meant to cover every point made by Professor Ackerman. It is
meant to portray the basic core of Professor Ackerman's discussion and the basic areas
in which criticism is necessary. The arguments used to support these points will be
the subject of the rest of the article.
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I. The "Leverage" Effect
Professor Ackerman sets out his initial models by using a hypotheti-
cal substandard housing area, Slumville, in the center of a hypothet-
ical city, Athens. He argues that with a given level of government
subsidy the imposition of a blanket code enforcement program would
raise the quality of the housing without leading to any increase in
rent.5 Having propounded his program, Professor Ackerman contrasts
it with an income maintenance or cash-payment alternative. He con-
cedes that the utility to the household of a dollar in cash would be
at least as great and probably greater than a dollar's worth of in-
creased housing quality," but he argues that there exists an "extra
dimension" which gives in-kind programs an advantage over cash-
payment programs. He contends that this added dimension requires
only the initial assumption that any costs to landlords associated
with improving the quality of housing will not be computed as social
costs in his system. This assumption itself should be subjected to
closer scrutiny.7 However, since the "leverage" effect which is the ob-
ject of this assumption is invalid even given the assumption, it is not
necessary to debate the assumption here.
Assuming then that only "governmental costs" will be counted, Pro-
fessor Ackerman displays his "leverage" effect with an arithmetic ex-
ample which employs the following figures:
(1) The costs imposed on landlords by increased code enforce-
ment will cause them to remove 3,000 of the 100,000 units
from the Slumville rental housing market unless govern-
ment subsidy is provided.
(2) The government subsidy necessary to keep these 3,000 units
on the market is $50 per unit per month.8
(3) The average terlant family values the increment in quality
caused by code enforcement at $20 per unit per month.
5. Professor Ackerman's models and their assumptions will be examined subsequently.
For the purpose of the present discussion, his models will be assumed correct.
6. The rationale for this argument was discussed in the introduction to this article.
7. The assumption places no societal value on a dollar taken from the landlord so
long as it is given to the tenant. This scheme should be distinguished from one in which
less societal value is given to the landlord's utility. Professor Ackerman's scheme in-
plicitly values the utility of the tenant as infinitely greater than that of the landlord,
not just twice or ten or one hundred times greater. Considering Professor Ackerman's
own realization that many slum landlords are low-income slum dwellers, such a scheme
of societal value seems harsh.
8. Professor Ackerman never indicates the form of this subsidy. If the money is to
go to those landlords who are about to exit the market, all landlords will have an in-
centive to claim that they would leave. This problem could be solved by the building
of public housing, but there would still be problems in determining the number of units
necessary until the Slumville housing market had reached some equilibrium position.
However, for the purposes of this article, Professor Ackerman's unarticulated, distor-
tionless, instantaneous subsidy system will be assumed.
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He proposes the following table to display his "extra dimension":0
PROGRAM COSTS BENEFITS
Code enforcement- 3,000 families 97,000 families in un-
housing subsidy x $50 per month = $150,000 subsidized housing X
$20 per month = $1,940,000
3,000 families in
subsidized sector X
$20 per month = $ 60,000
,2,000,000
Income 3,000 families 3,000 families
maintenance X $50 per month = $150,000 X $50 per month = $ 150,000
According to Professor Ackerman, the "leverage" effect exhibited
in this table provides his in-kind program with a theoretical superiority
over cash-payment programs so strong that it now forces proponents of
cash-payment plans to turn to ad hoc empirical arguments most of
which Professor Ackerman discusses and dispatches.
Professor Ackerman describes the explanation of this remarkable
discovery as "quite simple' and imparts it in a few sentences:
An expenditure of government funds on a negative income tax
does not permit the government to initiate a second program
which redistributes additional income to the poor at no expen-
diture of government money. A dollar spent on a negative tax
yields a dollar in benefits to the poor: there is no "leverage" ef-
fect. In contrast, a dollar spent on a special purpose housing sub-
sidy does have a "leverage" effect since it permits the government
to initiate a second income redistribution program-comprehen-
sive code enforcement-at no increase in government expenditure.
Thus a dollar spent on the special housing subsidy not only
benefits the direct recipient of the subsidy but also benefits all
those families who receive better private rental housing-at no
increase in rent-as a result of code enforcement.1 0
Professor Ackerman appears to assume that a program which dis-
tributes its benefits in the form of cash payments cannot tap the "cost-
less" fund provided by the landlord's contribution. If cash-payment
plans can be funded from Professor Ackerman's "costless" landlord
fund, then such cash-payment plans are not inherently inferior to in-
kind housing programs because of any "leverage" effect. The "lever-
age" effect established at the cost of such severe assumptions would
be meaningless and the state of knowledge would return to its pre-
Ackerman level.
9. The table is presented in Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 2, at 1121. The
"leverage" effect discussion occurs id. at 1119-29.
10. Id. at 1122.
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Cash-payment plans of many varieties can be fashioned to tap Pro-
fessor Ackerman's "costless" fund. Every violating landlord or every
landlord in Slumville" could be taxed in the amount of the improve-
ment costs and the receipts placed into a special fund. The "landlord
fund" could be distributed to the tenants of these landlords or to
tenants in general or to the poor in general. Perhaps the "cash pay-
ment" program most parallel in logistics to Professor Ackerman's own
plan would be the imposition of rent control in Slumville 12 with rents
reduced by the amount the landlord otherwise would have had to pay
for quality improvement.
13
Whatever the plan chosen, once the assumption is made that costs
to landlords are not counted as costs to society, any program funded
by these landlords' costs has the "leverage" effect regardless of the
form in which it distributes its benefits. The "leverage" effect exists
on the cost and not on the benefit side.
The trivial nature of the "leverage" effect becomes obvious when
Professor Ackerman's accounting system and his "mathematical" ex-
ample are more carefully examined. To expedite this process, an ad-
ditional table has been compiled which reflects not only Professor
Ackerman's programs and accounting system but an additional pro-
gram and a more complete accounting system:
PROGRAM COSTS (A) BENEFITS COSTS (C)
Ackerman's Housing 3,000 X $50 = 97,000 X $20 $4,850,000 +
Program $150,000 $1,940,000 $ 150.000 -
3,000 X $20 = $5,000,000
$ 60,000
$2,000,000
Ackerman's Income 3,000 X $50 - 3,000 X $50 = -. 3,000 X $50 =
Maintenance Program $150,000 $150,000 $150,000
Income Maintenance Pro- 3,000 X $50 = 97,000 X $50 $4,850,000 (from
gram with same fund- $150,000 $4,850,000 landlords' fund) +
ing as Ackerman's 3,000 X $50 = $150,000 (from
Housing Program $ 150,000 general funds) -
$5,000,000 $5,000,000
11. The model which provided the context for Professor Ackerman's "leverage" proof
assumed that all the housing in this particular area was uniformly substandard. Given
this assumption, all the landlords in the designated area could be taxed without the
administrative costs of code inspection.
12. Rent control may be associated for many readers with ineffective enforcement In
a tight housing market, diminution in incentive to build new housing, removal of housing
from the market, or decreased quality of rental units. These are potential problems in
the real world, not Professor Ackerman's world. The assumption of unresponsive (fixed)
supply and responsive demand plus the monumental assumptions of no in-migration
and no effect on housing investment will as easily support an effective rent control pro.
gram as it will a code enforcement program.
13. The $150,000 "government subsidy expenditure" can also assume varied roles in the
context of the various cash-payment plans. It can be paid as rent subsidies to landlords
in order to maintain the number of housing units at 100,000, its role in Professor Acker-
man's in-kind program, or it could be paid as additional direct cash payments to those
tenants who were evicted from the 3,000 units.
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The upper right hand quadrant of Table II is the same as Pro-
fessor Ackerman's table. The figures listed under "costs (A)" reflect
Professor Ackerman's "costless" fund accounting system. Those listed
under "costs (C)" represent the cost figures including the resource
cash of quality improvement expended by the landlords.
When all costs are counted (costs (C)), Professor Ackerman's pre-
ferred program appears substantially inferior to either his income
maintenance program or an income maintenance program which is
funded in a manner comparable to his preferred program."4 His pro-
gram shows a negative net benefit (deficit) of $3,000,000 while the
other programs show no deficit: his program is $3,000,000 inferior to
the others. The deficit reflects the fact that the recipients of $50 worth
of housing quality value it at less than $50 (e.g., $20) while recipients
of $50 in cash value it as $50.
Employment of the "governmental expenditure" accounting system
espoused by Professor Ackerman (costs (A)) manages to turn "deficit"
to "benefit" with Professor Ackerman's preferred program now exhib-
iting positive net benefits of $1,850,000 ($2,000,000 - $150,000). The
benefits associated with Professor Ackerman's income maintenance
plan remain unaltered with the switch in accounting system because
that plan was not privileged to tap the "costless" fund, the landlords
who lay the golden egg. However, an income maintenance program
with funding comparable to Professor Ackerman's preferred program
shows net benefits of $4,850,000 ($5,000,000 -$150,000), $3,000,000
more than Professor Ackerman's program. The advantage of the com-
parable income maintenance program over Professor Ackerman's pro-
14. The landlord's cost figure of $4,850,000 per month was arrived at by multiplying
97,000 rent units times $50 per unit per month. The number of rental units comes
directly from Professor Ackerman's assumption about the number of units which would
remain on the market and bear the costs of quality improvement without subsidy. The
$50 figure comes from Professor Ackerman's assumption that a subsidy of $50 per unit
per month would be necessary to keep the 3.000 rental units available to the tenants. If
anything, the $50 is probably an underestimate of the implicit cost figure inherent in
Professor Ackerman's hypothetical. The subsidy would equal the cost only if the 3.000
units had had no excess return relative to other uses (if revenue just covered variable
costs). Under those circumstances all the costs would have to be subsidized in order to
keep the units on the rental market. To the extent that some "excess revenues" are
present, there are costs which will not have to subsidize but can instead be imposed on
these landlords in the same manner in which the total costs were imposed on the 97,000
other units. Thus, in these cases, the observed subsidy is less than the unobserved cost
involved.
This process can be seen algebraically as follows: C = q + S. where C represents costs,
q represents quasi-rents and S represents the subsidy. For the 97,000 rental units q->C
(quasi-rents are greater than costs) and no subsidy is necessary. For the 3,000 units, q<C
(quasi-rents will not cover all costs). To the extent that quasi-rents are present at
all (q->0), subsidy will be less than cost (S<C) since S = C - q.
The reader need not greatly concirn himself with this discussion since any cost figure
arbitrarily substituted for the $50 figure will still show Professor Ackerman's "leverage"
effect to be meaningless.
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gram remains the same no matter which accounting system is em-
ployed. Professor Ackerman's "leverage" effect was produced by com-
paring non-parallel examples of in-kind and cash-payment programs.
When the parallel situations are compared, either accounting system
negates the existence of any "leverage" effect.
While Professor Ackerman fails to deal with comparably financed
cash-payment programs in the context of his "leverage" effect discus-
sion, he belatedly recognizes their existence more than fifty pages
after he has apparently closed his "leverage" discussion. This delay
combined with his failure to connect this subsequent discussion with
the "leverage" effect gives a misleading impression of the theoretical
strength of his "leverage" effect even were his attempt to dismiss the
alternative cash-payment plans successful. However, his belated ar-
guments concerning these alternatives are unsound and fail to re-
juvenate the "leverage" effect.
Professor Ackerman discusses two types of cash-payment plans capa-
ble of tapping the landlord fund.1a The first he labels the "slumlord
tax" plan: the costs of quality improvement are collected, placed in
a fund and paid to the tenant of the offending landlord. Professor
Ackerman contends that this plan is defective in two senses. If the
amount collected were equal to the amount the landlord would have
had to spend for quality improvement, the landlord would presum-
ably choose to make the quality improvement or at least he would
be indifferent."" This assertion is correct but hardly provides any
"leverage" or other advantage for his code enforcement program. The
cash-payment program would simply approximate the code enforce-
ment program to the extent that the landlord substituted quality im-
provements for tax payments. However, a tax set slightly lower than
the improvement costs would avoid even this result: A tax of $45
rather than $50 would make everyone better off. The landlords would
avoid the improvement and pay $5 per unit per month less. The
tenants would receive cash benefits they valued at $25 per month
15. In theory, even were he successful in negating the two variants he discusses, Pro.
Lessor Ackerman's attempt to support his "leverage" effect would fail since it must be
shown that all cash-payment forms are incapable of tapping the landlords' fund. How-
ever, since his argument as to the two variants is faulty, this approach need not be em-
phasized. These two arguments occur in Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 2, at
1182-86.
16. It might seem that as between paying the cash in the form of a fine or improving
the quality of his rental units, the landlord would choose the latter since he would
recoup at least a part of the loss in the form of higher property value. However, Pro-
fessor Ackerman has engineered his system so that norent increase is associated with'
any quality-improvement expenditure. Without rent increase, the value of the rental
units should not rise and the landlord would be indifferent ambng the tax, the im-
provements and in fact simply destroying the money.
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more than the quality improvements.
Professor Ackerman approaches this problem by asserting that in re-
sponse to a lesser tax of $20 per month (why $20 instead of $45?), the
landlord would simply raise his rent by $20 and recover the full
amount from his tenant. At first blush, such a process seems con-
sistent with intuition. But is it consistent with Professor Ackerman's
model? How can a landlord who could not pass on tie cost of im-
proving his rental units to his tenants, now pass on the cost of the
slumlord tax to his tenants? Professor Ackerman's model would seem
to foreclose any recapture of the slumlord tax through rent increase.
Yet in his slumlord tax discussion Professor Ackerman asserts that
the landlord -will automatically recapture his costs through rent in-
crease. Peculiarly enough, neither answer is correct. Due to the eco-
nomic assumptions made by Professor Ackerman, it is indeterminate
whether the slumlord tax can be passed on in the form of higher rent.
Professor Ackerman's assumptions fix the number of rental units,
make the supply side unresponsive to cost changes, and seemingly ne-
gate rent increase.' 7 However, the demand side is also unresponsive.
The cash payment and the increased rent take the same form. While
it is possible to conceive of "lukewarm" tenants who value quality
improvements costing $50 at a cash equivalent less than $50, $50 in
cash will by definition be valued at a cash equivalent of $50. Both
supply and demand are unresponsive. Economic theory will not yield
a solution.18 Thus, even given his assumptions, Professor Ackerman
cannot correctly assert that the slumlord tax will be passed on.
However, several alternative changes can be made in the cash-pay-
ment plan which will avoid even this indeterminacy and foreclose
any recapture of the slumlord tax through rent increase. The most
obvious such change would be the inclusion of a provision fixing rents
at their pre-tax level. Such a program would allow the benefits to be
distributed in cash (e.g., $45) and assure the tenant of no rent increase. 1
17. These assumptions are presented and discussed in notes 25-28 infra and accom-
panying text.
18. While the market does not yield a determinate solution, the relative bargaining
skills and power of the parties might. However, there is no a priori basis for determining
the direction of that solution.
Thus, the landlord may have superior bargaining skills and on that ground pass the
rent on. On the other hand, the existence of a coalition of tenants which would threaten
the evacuation of rental units would force the trend in the other direction. It should
be recalled that Professor Ackerman assumes no in.mi&ration of tenants. If any of Slum-
ville's population decides to double-up, if any out-migration occurs, or the population
is diminished by death this would provide sufficient sensitivity on the demand side to
negate the attempt to pass on the costs of the slumlord tax.
19. As suggested previously, a general rent control scheme which lowers Slumvillc
rents by $50 or less would provide a cash-payment plan with logistics analogous to Pro-
fessor Ackerman's preferred program. There would be no need for the government ap-
1183
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 82: 1175, 1973
An alteration in the definition of the recipient unit could also avoid
the indeterminacy and assure that rents would not increase. The $45
per month could be paid to each Slumville family whether or not it
continued to occupy a single rental unit. Since the cash payment would
no longer be contingent on occupancy of a separate dwelling unit, fami-
lies could double-up rather than face rent increase.2 0 Landlords would
confront the same vacancies which forced them to absorb the costs of
quality improvement under Professor Ackerman's model. 21
The slumlord tax plan is Professor Ackerman's invention. Even
against this plan of his own construction, his arguments are ineffective.
Feasible variations in this program disarm his arguments completely.22
Professor Ackerman also assails the would-be proponents of schemes
which call for the distribution of the landlords' fund to the poor in
general. His argument is in fact no argument at all.2 3 Professor
paratus to either collect or disburse any funds. The cash payment would take tie form
of a rent reduction by the landlord to his own tenant. The process is analogous to that
employed in the "implied warranty of habitability" cases such as Javins v. First National
Realty Corporation, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where rent was theoretically reduced
to the extent of diminution in habitability.
The effects of rent control or other rent reduction programs in the real world are
problematic. But no concern need be given these problems in the context of Professor
Ackerman's world. See note 12 supra.
20. All the mechanisms available to the tenant population in avoiding rent increase
in Professor Ackerman's plan are available here: doubling-up, living on the street, polit-
ical activity, etc. As long as payment is not conditioned on occupancy of a single rental
dwelling unit, it is no different in effect than a neutral increase in the tenant's income.
The landlord in Professor Ackerman's model is in no position to appropriate this increase.
21. There are again problems with such a scheme in the real world since there
would be an incentive for in-migration and the vacancies might be filled. However,
Slumville is Professor Ackerman's world and he assumes no in.migration. Stich an as-
sumption is necessary for his plan to succeed, but by making the assumption he pro-
duces success for plans which are alternatively superior to his preferred plan.
22. Professor Ackerman offers another argument against the slumlord tax which
deserves brief mention here. He insists that such a plan would necessitate an "adminis.
trative behemoth" which must not only inspect for code violations but also collect these
funds from unwilling landlords. It is difficult to see why such a structure would be
more costly or cumbersome than the structure implicit in his code enforcement plan.
The landlords who are ordered to make quality improvements are not likely to comply
instantaneously. It would appear easier to collect $45 from an uncooperative landlord
than to force $50 worth of quality improvements. The latter involves re-inspection, and
evaluation of quality. Such evaluations may provide the landlord with an excuse for ex-
tensive litigation in an effort to delay the enforcement process. It is difficult to conceive
of a "behemoth" of more terrifying dimensions than that involved in Professor Acker-
man's code enforcement plan. Also, such administrative problems can be minimized
by adoption of a rent control or general tax scheme.
23. Professor Ackerman's "argument" is as follows:
When faced with these insurmountable obstacles, the "tax.grant" advocate most
probably will be tempted to alter his proposal one final time, and suggest that in-
stead of compensating Slumville's tenantry, the revenue raised from the slumlord
levy should be placed in the general fund for worthy governmental purposes among
which redistribution may be numbered. By revising the proposal in this way, however,
the "tax" proponent has removed the only feature distinguishing it from the code
enforcement alternative. For absent any effort to compensate the tenantry in cash, a
"slumlord tax" is but a different label for a housing code enforced by "fines": if the
"taxes" are very high, slum landlords will improve (or abandon) all their buildings
to free themselves of their potential tax liability, just as they would when threatened
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Ackerman simply asserts that the effects of such a plan would be de
minimis. If he is concerned that the number of recipients will be
too large, and therefore the amount received by each too small, the
number of recipients could simply be reduced. Funds could be
distributed to all those living in Slumville or to all the poor in Athens
below an income level determined so as to select the number of
recipients desired. The figures in Professor Ackerman's own arith-
metic example indicate that a cash-payment plan has S3,000,000 more
in benefits to distribute than his in-kind plan. Surely the recipient
base can be expanded by a sizeable amount without providing lower
benefits per recipient than Professor Ackerman's preferred plan.
24
It has not been the object of the preceding discussion to promote a
slumlord tax plan, or a plan which distributes the landlords' fund to tie
poor in general, or a rent control plan. These plans have been sug-
gested in the context of Professor Ackerman's models, his accounting
system, and his theoretical "leverage" concept. In that context, these
cash-payment plans are superior to his preferred plan. What has been
by heavy 'fines"; if the tax is lower, the result will be identical to partial code en-
forcement; if so low as to be de minimis, the result will be equivalent to ineffective
enforcement:
Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 2, at 1185.
The "insurmountable obstacles" refer to Professor Ackerman's arguments about the
slumlord tax plan and have already been "surmounted."
24. Perhaps Professor Ackerman is attempting to introduce sonic "political reality"
and suggesting that if the landlords' fund were collected, it would not go to the poor.
This point might have validity in the real world. But if the realities ot the world are
introduced, we must examine 'possible subversion of a code enforcement plan by those
with resources to hire attorneys, bribe inspectors, or place political pressure on the code
enforcement authority. Since Professor Ackerman cannot make his system work in his owvn
abstract model, he can have little room for ad hoc "political reality" arguments.
Professor Ackerman offers two other arguments for code enforcement over cash-pay-
ment plans: (1) enforcement creates public goods and external benefits and (2) housing
improvement exhibits scale economies enjoyable by landlords only when all or almost all
of the units under their control are being renovated or improved. Regulating Slum
Housing, supra note 2. at 1177-79, 1181.
Both considerations are standard in the evaluation of any program. One can also mar-
shal a series of ad hoc "externality" and "economy of scale" arguments in favor of cash-
payment plans (e.g., reduced crime rates, increased quality of political participation, econ-
omies of scale for purchase by low-income consumer cooperatives). It does not take much
imagination to produce such arguments in the abstract. Howevcr, without some indica-
tion of the extent of these effects, an argument which merely notes their existence is
ineffectual. The effects might be substantial or they might be de minimus. Professor
Ackerman attempts no estimation of the size of these effects or of effects associated with
competing plans.
In addition, even if there were substantial public good and scale effects, it is not clear
who would receive the benefits. In-kind programs may produce substantial benefits for
the non-poor. These programs may be justitied on the basis of such benefits, but not
on the basis of their distributive effects. Since Professor Ackerman's program would
force the landlord to achieve a prescribed level of quality, any reductions in cost asso-
dated with externalities produced by the similar activities of neighboring landlords
would seem to accrue to the landlord, not the tenant. In reality, it is questionable how
much of these benefits would accrue to low-income landlords. In Professor Ackernan's
world, none of such benefits would be reflected unless they happened to reduce the
government subsidy.
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shown is not the success of these plans but the illusion of Professor
Ackerman's "leverage" concept, and the dubious nature of his model.
The lesson is a melancholy one: knowledge about in-kind versus cash-
payment plans has not been advanced.
II. Empirical Assumptions
Professor Ackerman's first model has nine explicit assumptions2-
along with an implicit tenth.20 One set of assumptions fixes the sup-
ply of rental units in Slumville and makes that supply unresponsive
to the increase in costs caused by code enforcement.27 On the demand
side Professor Ackerman produces tenant responsiveness to rent in-
creases by assuming that tenants are knowledgeable and mobile, and
that they vary in their taste for quality increments. 2 Such a model
allows increase in quality through code enforcement while foreclosing
rent increase. Within the assumptions, Professor Ackerman's conclu-
sions are valid if not startling.
The second model relaxes the assumptions which fix the quantity
of rental units supplied. However, the second model unlike the first
yields no pertinent conclusions even if its assumptions are accepted as
realistic. The second model assumes that the number of low-income
rental units supplied will respond to cost changes. However, the fact
of response of itself neither supports nor rejects any program or policy.
It is the degree of response which is crucial. Aware of this fact, Pro-
fessor Ackerman presents a series of arguments which attempt to mini-
25. The nine explicit assumptions are described by Professor Ackerman as follows:
For purposes of the present discussion, then, assume (1) both landlords and ten-
ants act rationally in their self-interest; (2) no landlord or group of landlords has
successfully established a monopoly or oligopoly position in the rental market; (3)
tenants are aware of the range of prices and quality levels of accommodations offered
for rent in Slumville and experience no significant cost in moving from one part of
Slumville to another; (4) all of Slumville's accommodations are not only slums, but
are equally slummy; (5) similarly, all of Slumville's tenants inflict equal damage
upon the physical stnctures of the houses in which they reside; (6) a significant
number of poor provincials are not entering Athens from the outlands nor are Slum.
villites emigrating to the hinterlands; (7) each and every landlord in Slumville earns
a rate of return on his investment which substantially exceeds the return available
when the property is used for other purposes; indeed (8) even if the landlords are
forced to bring their residential properties up to code, their rate of return would
still exceed that available for any other use of the property; and (9) no landlord will
find it more profitable to abandon his building entirely when faced with the necessity
of investing substantial sums to bring his tenement up to code.
Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 2, at 1102-03 (footnotes omitted).
26. It is also assumed that not all tenants have the same taste for increments in
housing quality, and that at least a small group places virtually no value on the marginal
quality increment envisioned by the new code enforcement program.
27. Assumptions (7), (8), and (9) are directly applicable. See note 25 supra.
28. See assumption (3) in note 25 supra and the implicit assumption observed in note
26 supra.
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mize the extent of response by suppliers of rental units to the impo-
sition of the additional costs of quality improvement. In addition, he
argues that the improved quality of housing will not increase appre-
ciably the demand for these units via in-migration to the slum area.
Professor Ackerman's arguments contain critical analytical errors
and his assertions present an erroneous impression of tie state of knowl-
edge. If accepted as valid, Professor Ackerman's analysis and factual
assertions would prompt a misallocation of research interest and re-
sources. On those grounds his arguments are worth examination.
A. The Rate of Rental Unit Removal
Even if it is assumed that greater code enforcement would cause
no present diminution in the Slumville housing supply (the outcome
produced in Professor Ackerman's first model), it still becomes neces-
sary to consider what will happen to that supply as time passes. The
constant housing supply derived in Professor Ackerman's first model
followed from his assumption that landlords would have sufficient
revenue to cover variable costs even when the additional code costs
were included. Professor Ackerman emphasized that lie did not as-
sume that investment in housing received any unusual return; he
based his constant supply solely upon the ability of landlords to con-
tinue to meet variable cost. Underlying Professor Ackerman's con-
clusion is an unarticulated standard proposition of economic analysis
which holds that a firm will not cease operations so long as its revenue
covers variable cost. However, it is also a proposition of economic
analysis that fixed costs become variable costs over time. In more
common sense terms, the physical structure which houses the rental
units depreciates over time. At some point, as time passes, each of the
structures will need refurbishing or rebuilding. At this point, the
variable costs relevant to the decision to continue in the rental busi-
ness will include elements of formerly fixed costs and the decision
to remove rental units will be contingent upon a sufficient return
on investment in housing. Thus, even if the immediate supply of
rental units is constant, the supply will not remain constant as time
passes, and its rate of change will depend on the costs of continued
operation including those associated with code enforcement.20 The
removal of 3,000 units which Professor Ackerman hypothetically
29. If the code enforcement costs were imposed only in the first year and not again.
this long-term effect could be ignored. However, as Professor Ackerman's own continuing
subsidy ($50 per month) indicates, the maintenance of a given standard of quality de-
mands continued investment over time.
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visualizes in his "leverage" effect example may only be the figure
at the end of the first period. 30 By the second year the number may
be 3,500 and the "government" subsidy $175,000 per month for that
year. In the third year the attrition may reach 4,000 and the subsidy
would be $200,000, etc. While the figures utilized are hypothetical,
the effect is real. Eventually the owner of the parcel will be in a
position to choose between rebuilding and fleeing the rental-unit mar-
ket. At that point, the existence of additional costs imposed by code
enforcement will make flight more attractive. Professor Ackerman ig-
nores this increased diminution in supply over time.
B. Effects on Construction of New Housing
In one page, Professor Ackerman disposes of two other aspects of
the supply question: the adverse effect of increased costs on the rate
of low-income housing construction and the adverse effect of increased
costs on construction of higher-income housing with its indirect ef-
fect on the supply of low-income housing through "trickle down."
His approach is, to say the least, cavalier. As to low-income housing
he states:
It may be argued that imposing "code costs" upon Slumville
owners will discourage new housing construction in the private
sector, thereby lowering the supply of housing to low income
groups in the long run-which in turn will mean an increase in
rents to the poor. If it were economically feasible for the private
sector to build new housing for the poor without government
subsidy, this objection would have very substantial weight. But,
in fact, unsubsidized new construction for the poor has long since
ceased to be economically feasible.81
This argument is analytically unsound. Whether the present mar-
ket conditions require subsidy is irrelevant to an economic analysis
of the impact of code enforcement on low-income housing construc-
tion. Code enforcement involves additional costs for the housing in-
vestor both initially and in maintenance. These additional costs will
be reflected in the project evaluation calculus which determines the
amount of investment in low-income housing. Given the present level
of government subsidy necessary for low-income housing construc-
tion, the additional costs imposed by additional code enforcement will
make the net benefits more negative and require additional subsidies
30. The initial figure comes from Professor Ackerman's "leverage" table which is
reproduced at p. 1179 supra.
31. Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 2, at 1117.
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to maintain the same level of construction. If Professor Ackerman in-
tends to increase the government subsidy for new low-income housing
construction to offset this effect, he must include this additional sub-
sidy in the costs of his plan. In either case, he can hardly dismiss the
effect of increased costs on investment by reference to previous
subsidies.
Concerning investment in housing in general and therefore the po-
tential for trickle down, Professor Ackerman states:
Since the poor are dependent upon old buildings, the argu-
ment that code enforcement discourages new construction must
be recast in a different, and far less imposing, form. One must
argue that when a developer is considering the profitability of a
middle-class residential apartment house, he will seriously take
into account the possibility that in twenty or thirty years time
the building's profitability might be significantly reduced if (a)
it is then within a slum district and (b) the city is then actively
pursuing a comprehensive code enforcement program. Even those
who have the greatest faith in the entrepreneurial abilities of the
American businessman would concede that the sensible developer
would discount the possible costs of code enforcement twenty
years hence as de minimis. Thus, if the government wishes to run
a comprehensive code enforcement program without (a) increas-
ing rent levels or (b) forcing Slumville families onto the streets
or into permanently overcrowded conditions, it simply must make
up the difference between the number of units withdrawn from
the Slumville market and the number trickling down from Mid-
dleburg. It may properly ignore the alleged "long run" impact
the program will have on housing supply.a2
Once again the term de minimis is substituted for meaningful dis-
cussion.33 Present-value analysis which provides the cornerstone of proj-
ect evaluation does value a future dollar less than a present one. A
dollar in twenty years is worth much less than one received today.
But present-value analysis does not a priori negate the future amount.3'
32. Id.
33. Professor Ackerman declares de minimis the possibility that professional investors
would consider future costs in their present decisions to invest in new rental housing con-
struction rather than alternative investment projects. The entire thrust of this argument
is inconsistent with Professor Ackerman's alleged mode of analysis. Throughout his ar-
tide Professor Ackerman employs a traditional economic analysis and defends this anal-
ysis against would-be critics as a useful means of analyzing slum housing. see, e.g., id.
at 1144-48. His basic models assume that low-income tenants are sensitive to slight changes
in rent and motivated to alter their behavior in reaction to these changes. Yet lie con-
tends that professional investors are a priori insensitive to alterations in the potential
flow of income because those alterations will take place in twenty or thirty years.
34. The difference in relative value of a dollar twenty years hence varies with the
discount rate employed. At five percent, the present value of a dollar in twenty y)-ars is
approximately thirty-eight cents; at six percent, it is worth approximately thirty-one
cents; at seven percent, it is worth approximately twenty-six cents, etc. These figures
are easily obtainable from any present-value table.
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A change of $50 per month per unit in twenty or thirty years does
not have zero present value. Such a change in flow would reduce the
twentieth, twenty-first, etc. year's net benefits by $600 per year. The
actual present value of such a flow for the remaining twenty years
of the structure 35 at a discount rate of eight percent z0 would be ap-
proximately $1,250. Is $1,250 per rental unit de minimis?
Some perspective can be gained on this question by comparing this
figure with the present value of a change in the mortgage rate. The
supply of housing units is highly sensitive to changes in the borrowing
(mortgage) rate. An increase of one-half of one percent can percep-
tibly diminish construction activity. If construction costs are assumed
to be $20,000 per rental unit ($1,000,000 for a fifty unit apartment
building), the mortgage is assumed to cover the forty year life of the
building, and the eight percent discount rate is applied, the present
value of the difference in costs produced by a one-half of one percent
mortgage rate increase is approximately $995.37 Why would investors
be highly sensitive to $995 while considering $1,250 de minimis?
The figures can be changed by manipulating the discount rates,
construction costs, mortgage duration or building life.38 The exact
amounts are unimportant. Their general range is sufficient to indi.
cate that the additional code costs imposed by Professor Ackerman's
preferred program may have a strong detrimental effect upon the
supply of housing to the poor. Professor Ackerman simply dismissed
a question which should centrally concern any effort to assess the ef-
35. Forty years is generally assumed to be the economic life of a structure. In gen.
cral, such a figure underestimates the actual physical life of most multiple.unit structures.
Thus, the use of forty years underestimates the period for which the code cost will be
imposed, and therefore underestimates the present value of the code costs.
36. The eight percent rate represents the upper limit on mortgage rates and prob-
ably overestimates the alternative rate of return generally available. Again this over-
estimation of the discount rate underestimates the true present value of the code costs.
37. A .05 percent increase in the mortgage rate would mean an increase of $88.50
per year in payments for a forty year mortgage with an initial principal of 520,000. The
present value of $88.50 per year for forty years is 5995.31.
38. Professor Ackerman also alludes to the "uncertainty" of the imposition of code
costs as minimizing their present impact on construction decisions. Such a point has
theoretical validity. Indeed, if the probability is less than .8 and an expected value ap-
proach is employed, the expected present value of code enforcement costs would be
reduced below the level of the mortgage costs.
However, there is reason to believe that the probability of code enforcement is rea-
sonably high given Professor Ackerman's plan.
New housing is important in Professor Ackerman's model because of the trickle-down
effect. The type of housing most important to trickle-down is that which has the po.
tential of conversion to low-income housing. Eventually this housing must be available
in sufficient supply or Professor Ackerman's trickle-down effect will be drastically re-
duced. It is exactly this sort of housing which will have the highest probability of facing
increased costs due to code enforcement at some point in its useful life.
Professor Ackerman visualizes an effectual code enforcement provrant with broad scope
and substantial impact. It is not a priori obvious that prospecttve investors will view the
probability of future imposition of costs via such a program as insubstantial. Only careful
consideration of this effect will determine its substance.
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fects of quality improvement measures on the housing market. It may
be desirable to sustain the long-term detrimental effects on investment
to gain short-run advantages. But this issue is central, not tangential,
and certainly not foreclosed.
C. Effects on In-Migration
Even if the supply of housing were fixed and insensitive to changes
in cost conditions, the rent in Slumville would increase if the demand
curve shifted to the right (if demand increased at all rental levels).
An in-migration of tenants could occasion such a shift.
Professor Ackerman's preferred program would offer substantial
quality improvements at no increase in rent. Such a program would
seem likely to attract new tenants to the area. One likely source of in-
migration is from nearby areas with housing quality only somewhat
greater than the substandard quality available in the slum area prior
to code enforcement. Another source of in-migration is from other
cities or regions.
Professor Ackerman claims that neither of these sources will pro-
vide appreciable in-migration. In connection with in-migration from
lower middle-class areas, he simply asserts that "it seems clear that
the mere enforcement of housing code standards will not generate
such a population movement to any significant extent."30 His only
support for this assertion is a citation to a study .which he describes
as establishing the "virtual irreversibility" of a shift from white to
non-white occupancy. Even if the study had as universal a scope as
Professor Ackerman claims, such a citation hardly negates the pos-
sibility of in-migration from lower middle-class areas. The only ref-
erence is to race. Not all non-whites live in substandard housing.
There is presumably a lower middle-class non-white population which
could provide sufficient potential in-migration given quality improve-
ments. Despite the connotation of terms such as "middle class" and
"lower class," these categories represent rather arbitrary divisions along
a continuum. A substantial improvement in slum housing quality
should bring that housing to a quality level as great as or greater than
the quality of the housing possessed by families somewhat further along
the continuum. It does not seem "clear" that such improvement, very
possibly accompanied by lower relative rent, will not attract sub-
stantial movement from lower middle-class areas.
In connection with inter-city or inter-regional migration, Professor
Ackerman alludes to empirical studies which show that "the primary
59. Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 2, at 114041.
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magnet for migrants has been a strong job market." 40 These studies
may indicate that the attraction of substantially improved housing is
weaker than the attraction of jobs, but it does not indicate that the
former is an unimportant force. Professor Ackerman also alludes to
the importance of the location of friends and family. It is difficult
to assess a priori that such factors will dominate the effect of so unique
an occurrence as a substantial improvement in living conditions at no
increase in rent. The location of better employment and even the
location of relatives need not exclude choice among qualities of hous-
ing. If families are strongly drawn by the greater family utility in-
herent in higher wages and better working conditions, it is difficult
to exclude the possibility that greater family utility in the form of
better housing conditions will not play a part.
Professor Ackerman's own calculus demands that low-income fami-
lies gain at least moderately substantial utility from housing improve-
ments.41 Surely Professor Ackerman should pause before dismissing
the possibility that this utility is sufficient incentive for in-migration.
While the incentive might operate only over a long time period, the
correct approach is to determine the strength and timing of the in-
centive, not simply to deny its existence.
42
III. Projections
The tone of the preceding discussion has been primarily negative.
While it is tempting to suggest my own pet answer to the problems
of housing and the poor, that would violate the basic counsel of the
previous discussion. Professor Ackerman's difficulties did not stem
from his inability to choose the "correct" program, but from his de-
sire to promote a program before issues basic to the choice of any
program had been stated, let alone solved.
40. Id. at 1143.
41. Id. at 1126-27.
42. Professor Ackerman's own discussion reflects the tension produced by his affinity
for his assumptions. Thus, in support of the redistributive fairness of his plan, Professor
Ackerman makes the following argument:
It follows a fortiori that code enforcement's relative equity is enhanced in a society
like our own in which the general revenue fund is collected in significant part from
taxes which are either regressive (like the sales tax) or haphazar and probably re-
gressive (like the real estate tax), and in which owners of real estate receive substan-
tial federal tax advantages.
Id. at 1176 (emphasis supplied and footnote omitted). He argues that the property tax
can be regressive. But he fails to note that the property tax is regressive exactly when
landlords are able to pass the additional costs of the tax on to their lower-incone tenants
in the form of rent increases. If the landlords can pass this cost on to their tenants, they
can pass on the costs of code improvements. If one is possible, both are possible. If Pro.
fessor Ackerman notes the regressive nature of the property tax in support of his ar-
guments, he should also note the implications for the practical application of his model
and for the program he proposes.
Professor Ackerman's second argument against the slumlord tax also exhibits some of
this internal tension. See p. 1183 supra.
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The rapid migration from rural to urban areas and between urban
areas during the recent past may have produced a sizeable upward
shift in the demand curve for urban rental units. The rate of this
migration may have been underestimated by builders. This factor plus
such market impediments as land use control legislation or code en-
forcement may have retarded the response of new construction to this
shift in demand. These forces may have generated sufficient windfall
profits or "economic rents" to provide a "landlords' fund" which could
in theory be taxed away with little or no effect on the supply of hous-
ing. 43 However, the existence and extent of these forces and their in-
teraction with governmental programs aimed at promoting new hous-
ing construction are yet to be established.
Even if economic rents exist in a general geographic area, it will
be difficult to identify the individual recipients of these rents and the
extent of their receipts. Failure to identify the correct landlords or
to assess the economic rents correctly would adversely affect the supply
of housing. Information is not costless, and the identification and
measurement could well prove too expensive relative to the revenues
obtainable.
Even if the expected revenues outweigh these costs, it remains to
consider how the economic rents will be acquired and redistributed.
The realistic parameters of a substantial variety of in-kind and cash-
payment programs will need consideration. The objects of the plans
discussed, the breadth of the distribution, and the administrative costs
of each program will require comparison. The "positive economics"
of the administrative structures will also require careful considera-
tion (e.g., how likely is it that a code enforcement bureau will be
subverted into an agency which protects the interest of landlords
against tenants or of wealthier landlords against poorer landlords?).
By its nature such a statement of issues is incomplete and shallow.
When each issue is attacked intensively, it will generate many addi-
tional issues. The process of achieving the correct policy solution in
this highly complex area is incremental at best. Small, frustratingly
slow steps are the reality; sweeping pronouncements are illusion.
43. It is important here to distinguish between "quasi-rents," which would involve revc-
nues in excess of variable costs in the short run, and "economic rents," which involvc re-
turns in excess of normal market return on investlent. The former provided the basis for
Professor Ackerman's model. Taxation of "quasi-rents" should affect the supply of housing.
However, taxation of economic rents should not affect even the long-run supply. That
supply should expand with expanded demand since normal market rate would not be
diminished by the taxation. It should be noted that this assertion is an uneasy, one. Eco-
nomic theory deals with equilibrium states. The dynamics of the process and rate of
movement from one equilibrium to another is not as well handled by the theory. Thus.
although the equilibrium supply of housing should expand to meet the new demand
irrespective of the removal of economic rents, the rate at which the new equilibrium
is attained could be affected adversely by the removal.
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